What we've built.

Quarterly readiness walk for executives, defenders, and the people who keep the lights on. Modern ransomware steals first, encrypts maybe, and most damage happens after the first signs were already visible.

Wire fraud is rarely a technology failure. It is a trust-routing failure inside an organisation. The controls below are for finance, IT, and the executives who keep accidentally being the weakest link.

Tabletop for the moment you discover a privileged credential is in the wrong hands. Run this with your team before you need it. The drill is where you find out whether your revocation story is real.

A wire has gone to the wrong account. Recovery odds drop sharply after the first 60 minutes. The mailbox is probably still compromised. Move on the bank, not the keyboard.

Ransom notes are visible. The chain that put them there is not. The first hour is decided in the months before it. Contain, preserve, hold the line on irreversible decisions.

A privileged account is in someone else's hands. Cut the access, scope what they touched, decide whether the account is salvageable. The cuts are a sequence, not a checklist.

Something looks like it left. Quiet investigation is the discipline. Premature disclosure damages trust if it was wrong. Premature containment tips off the attacker and loses you scope.

The incident has stopped moving. The work is not over. Preserve, restore trust, and stabilise the team before anything else. Most second-incidents start here.

Blameless review for week one or two. The point is to learn, not to assign. The artefact is a small number of actions that will measurably reduce time-to-detect, time-to-contain, or time-to-decide next time.

The system is back. The people are not. This is the part most teams skip. The bill for an incident arrives later than the incident, and it arrives in the people who held the line.